Introduction
Over the past twenty to thirty years, it has become clear that many Islamists have accepted the rules of democracy, defined here in a very minimal way as a political system that has the people as its ultimate source of power and holds regular elections through which the public can express its political views.1 Publications from the last two or three decades have shown convincingly that organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood have been willing to work within the political system-instead of overthrowing it-in countries such as Egypt,2 Jordan3 and others.4 Moreover, it has also become clear that, while doing so, many Islamists have actually accepted (aspects of) democracy and have done this on Islamic grounds through concepts such as ijmāʿ (consensus), bayʿa (oath of fealty) and, particularly, shūrā (consultation).5 This widespread acceptance of democracy by moderate Islamists, however, cannot obscure that radical Islamists,6 represented by Jihādī-Salafīs7 in general and organisations such as al-Qāʿida in particular, very often reject democracy as an "un-Islamic" system.8 These radical Islamists who reject democracy are often referred to as takfīrīs by their opponents because of their relatively broad application of the label kāfir ("unbeliever", pl. kuffār) to Muslims they deem apostates (murtaddūn). This same concept is also applied by them to democracy and its supporters, although not always in the same way. While the support for and, to a lesser extent, the rejection of democracy have been dealt with extensively in the literature, the exact reasons for applying takfīr to democracy and democrats and how this differs from one context to another have not. This topic is therefore what this contribution focuses on. Based mostly on the Arabic radical Islamist writings (books, articles, fatwās) on this issue9, I will first deal with the legitimisation of takfīr of democracy as a system, followed by the application of the concept to democrats. While the radical Islamist rejection of democracy as such is quite uniform, takfīr of democrats is not, as we will see. The differentiation between radical Islamists on this issue becomes even greater when we turn to the third subject of this contribution, namely the application of takfīr to democratic processes in actual practice in two different Muslim countries: Jordan and Iraq. The goal of this article is three-fold: firstly, it seeks to show what arguments radical Islamists use to 5 Abootalebi, "Islam, Islamists, and Democracy"; Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State"; Ashour, "Democratic Islam?"; Esposito and Piscatori, "Democratization," pp. 434-38; Esposito and Voll, Islam, pp. 27-30; Krämer, "Islamist Notions"; Shavit, "Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy?"; El-Solh, "Islamist Attitudes". 6 I define radical Islamists here as those Islamists who reject working within the system and call for or even actively work towards overthrowing it. 7 I define Jihādī-Salafīs as those Salafīs who not only see jihād as a tool with which to confront the dār al-kufr ("the abode of unbelief", i.e. the lands where Islamic law is not applied), but who also believe it can be used to confront nominally Muslim opponents within the dār al-Islām. See also Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, pp. 9-10. There are also other, non-Jihādī-Salafīs who reject democracy, however. For more on Salafism, see Meijer, Global Salafism; Rougier, Qu'est-ce que le salafisme? 8 McCants, "Al Qaeda's Challenge"; Lahoud, The Jihadis' Path, pp. 147-178. 9 The Arabic writings used for this article were downloaded from the biggest online jihādī library, www.tawhed.ws (see notes for more precise links), unless stated otherwise, and were all still available on 02/01/2014. All URLs given provide links to the HTML-versions of the writings since direct links to Word-versions often do not exist. Word-versions of most writings themselves do exist, however, and the page references given in the present contribution refer to those, except when only HTML-versions were available.
